The impact of ‘Spiderweb’ Ukraine’s massive drone attack on Russian air bases was a blow to the Kremlin’s pride — but what does it mean for the war?
The Ukrainian Security Service’s (SBU) “Spiderweb” operation, which targeted Russian air bases in five regions on Sunday, was expertly executed and dealt a major blow to the Kremlin’s pride — but it’s not likely to have any real impact on the course of the war. It’s not clear yet how many aircraft were actually destroyed, but all available evidence suggests the losses were far fewer than the more than 40 bombers that the SBU claimed. The 10–13 aircraft whose losses were confirmed by photo and video evidence represents about a 10 percent reduction in Russia’s fleet of flyable planes of that type. It’s also worth noting that long-range aviation has played only a limited role in the war against Ukraine — and has been the least significant component of Russia’s nuclear triad.
How many planes did the SBU manage to hit?
- According to videos and satellite images, Ukraine’s operation hit at least 10 Tu-95MS and Tu-22M bombers at the Belaya air base in the Irkutsk region and the Olenya air base in the Murmansk region.
- However, no satellite images from Olenya have been released so far. All reported losses there are based on drone footage provided by the SBU, which shows three destroyed bombers and one military transport aircraft.
- In one video, a man who appears to be a firefighter at the Belaya base claims that eight aircraft there were severely burned. Visual evidence, including published satellite images, confirms that at least seven bombers were lost.
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- Notably, Belaya also housed Tu-160 supersonic strategic bombers, which are far more expensive and modern than the Tu-95s. These appear to have been left untouched.
- Two other air bases — Ivanovo (Severny), home to A-50 airborne radar detection aircraft, and Dyagilevo, which also houses Tu-95s — were reportedly targeted as well, according to the SBU. So far, however, no video evidence has emerged from either location.
- It’s likely that the SBU’s claim of 41 bombers destroyed is a significant exaggeration.
Did Ukraine use ordinary FPV drones for these attacks?
Not exactly. On the front lines, both armies use similar drones that are typically controlled via radio signals, which limits their range to about 15 kilometers (nine miles). Recently, both sides — especially the Ukrainian Armed Forces — have begun using relay systems mounted on larger drones to extend the range of kamikaze drones to 20 or even 30 kilometers (about 12–19 miles). But in Sunday’s attacks on Russian air bases, it appears that the operators were located thousands of kilometers away from the targets.
Most likely, the drones — and the mechanisms used to open the containers they were housed in — were equipped with mobile modems using Russian SIM cards. Additionally, the drones were running ArduPilot, a commercial UAV autopilot system, as seen in the control interface shown in SBU-released videos. The autopilot helps compensate for delays and other issues associated with long-distance control over mobile networks.
This isn’t entirely new: both Ukrainian and Russian forces have previously used mobile networks on enemy territory, including on later versions of Russia’s long-range Geran drones equipped with video cameras. What is new is the operation’s complexity: the drones were loaded with explosives inside Russia and launched close to their targets, apparently without any human assistance on the ground near the air bases.
That level of sophistication makes similar attacks difficult to scale. According to Ukrainian officials, this particular strike took a year and a half to prepare. Among other issues, it’s unlikely that trucks packed with drones can be reused for future missions. However, small drones equipped with mobile modems — because they’re cheap, easy to get, and hard to defend against — could become a broader security issue not just in Russia and Ukraine, but in other countries as well.
- In Ukraine, efforts are underway to filter traffic on mobile networks to prevent them from being used to control hostile drones — though it’s unclear how effective this is.
- In Russia, the response has been to shut down mobile service temporarily to protect sensitive political events (such as Russia’s May 9 Victory Day parade) or high-value targets. But in the long term, blanket outages aren’t sustainable for social and economic reasons.
It’s possible that the Russian authorities will now begin cutting mobile service more frequently near air bases — at least during times when a large number of aircraft are present.
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How much damage did the attack do to Russia’s war machine? And what will it mean for Moscow’s current offensive?
These strikes are unlikely to have much impact on the overall course of the war — even if the actual bomber losses are significantly higher than what’s been confirmed through visual evidence.
- Russia’s Tu-95 bombers — along with its Tu-160s, which were not targeted — form the backbone of the air-based component of Russia’s strategic forces. This branch of the nuclear triad has traditionally been the weakest (the others are the ground-based and submarine-launched systems). Its role is largely symbolic. However, unlike submarines or intercontinental ballistic missile systems, these aircraft can also carry conventional weapons, primarily cruise missiles.
- Similarly, the main role of the Tu-22 long-range bombers, which are not part of the strategic forces, is to strike enemy carrier groups with nuclear payloads. But they, too, can be used for conventional bombing with unguided bombs (not an option in the current war due to air defense threats) or cruise missile strikes.
In the war against Ukraine, these bombers have mainly been used to carry cruise missiles, but their role has been secondary. In recent years, Russia’s military has relied more on ballistic missiles and long-range drones — partly because cruise missiles are vulnerable to air defenses and fighter jets, and partly because missile supplies are limited. In any case, there are far more bombers available than needed for current operations.
From the first year of the war, bombers have proved vulnerable to air base strikes. Previous Ukrainian drone attacks had already destroyed or damaged several Tu-22s and one Tu-95. As a result, Russian commanders began relocating them to remote bases in Siberia and the Kola Peninsula. Before each new wave of strikes on Ukraine, a few bombers would be flown into airfields in central Russia.
It’s unlikely that this sabotage operation involving drone-packed trucks will fundamentally change how Russia uses its long-range aviation in the war.
Still — these bombers are part of Russia’s strategic nuclear forces. Shouldn’t we expect Russia to respond with a nuclear strike?
No, we shouldn’t. While Russia did amend its nuclear doctrine last year to lower the threshold for using nuclear weapons — now explicitly including large-scale drone attacks as a possible trigger — this doesn’t mean a response is automatic.
First, the doctrine doesn’t legally bind the Russian leadership to any strict procedures when deciding whether to launch a strike — they’re free to act based on the circumstances. Second, even the latest and most hardline version of the doctrine doesn’t clearly apply in this case. The drone strikes on air bases did not disrupt Russia’s ability to retaliate with nuclear force, nor did they pose a threat to “the very existence of the state,” one of the key thresholds cited in the doctrine.
That said, a strike — especially one carried out that brings no major response from Russia — on bases linked to the nuclear triad is significant in military-strategic terms. For years, Western policymakers have debated whether Putin’s “red lines” can actually be crossed: Should Russia’s nuclear threats, whether explicit or implied, shape decisions about aid to Ukraine? Or should those threats be treated as bluffs? The SBU is likely trying to prove the latter.
