Untangling Operation ‘Spiderweb’ Arms control expert Pavel Podvig explains what Ukraine’s surprise drone strikes reveal about Russia’s strategic nuclear forces
On June 1, Ukraine attacked Russian military airfields with hundreds of drones as part of Operation “Spiderweb.” According to Ukrainian media reports, the drones hit at least four different airfields, striking targets in the Irkutsk, Murmansk, Ryazan, and Ivanovo regions. Kyiv claims to have hit 41 strategic aircraft, though Meduza is unable to verify this information. President Volodymyr Zelensky said preparations for the surprise operation began 18 months prior. He stated that “Spiderweb” was coordinated from inside Russia, at an “office” near one of the Federal Security Service's regional headquarters. “This represents our most extensive long-range operation to date. Of course, we can't reveal everything now, but these Ukrainian actions will definitely be in the history books,” Zelensky said, calling the operation's result “absolutely brilliant.”
Meduza spoke to Pavel Podvig, director of the Russian Nuclear Forces Project, to learn more about Russia’s strategic aviation and its role in Russia's broader military strategy. Meduza in English translated and summarized Podvig’s remarks.
Speaking to Meduza’s daily news podcast, Chto Sluchilos, nuclear arms control expert Pavel Podvig said Ukraine’s “Spiderweb” drone attacks “obviously inflicted notable damage,” including less tangible psychological effects on Russia’s armed forces. It’s still unclear exactly how many Russian aircraft the operation managed to destroy, but available evidence shows that multiple Tu-95 strategic bombers were damaged, likely beyond repair.
At the same time, Podvig noted that Ukraine seems to have been careful to limit its drone strikes to “bombers that actually participate in attacks on Ukrainian territory,” ignoring some of Russia’s key strategic bomber bases. For example, Ukraine apparently targeted no Tu-160 bombers, which Moscow reportedly has not used in attacks against Ukraine.
This caution does not necessarily mean that the Zelensky administration warned Washington about the operation. For example, it’s possible that Kyiv did attempt strikes against other airfields; indeed, some reports suggest that a semi-truck carrying Ukrainian drones caught fire before reaching Russia’s strategic “Ukrainka” long-range airbase in the Amur region. Ukrainian military leaders have already tested Moscow’s “red lines” on nuclear deterrence, launching drones at Russian strategic early-warning radar sites in late May 2024. “We don’t know all the behind-the-scenes conversations,” Podvig told Meduza, commenting on that earlier operation. “I think that at some point, the United States probably hinted to Ukraine that they need to be careful with certain targets.”
The “Spiderweb” attacks likely required no special intelligence necessitating American involvement, Podvig said. The FPV-drone operators reportedly selected their targets directly, and “a person sitting on a hill with binoculars” would have been sufficient reconnaissance to confirm the presence of the warplanes.
Russia’s nuclear triad
Podvig rejected claims that Ukraine’s drone attacks might be used to justify a nuclear counterattack under Russia’s national security doctrine. He argued that “Spiderweb” poses no threat to Russia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, nor does it endanger the retaliatory potential of the country’s strategic forces, especially because bombers play “at best a supporting role” in retaliatory strike scenarios:
This entire so-called “strategic triad,” the reason it exists, the reason it has such symbolic significance, is that this is how it developed at the time. This was the 1950s and the 1960s. Ultimately, it turned out this way. In the United States, they had their own reasons for the rivalry between different branches of the military. In the Soviet Union, there was something similar, but essentially, they copied the United States and adopted its experience.
But they didn’t copy everything. Yes, both sides developed ground-based intercontinental missiles, both of which were silo-based. The Soviet Union, however, created mobile missiles, which Russia still maintains today. Also, there's a fleet of strategic submarines with ballistic missiles on board — this is the basis of deterrent forces (the basis of forces that should ensure a retaliatory strike in case of a nuclear attack). Things get more complicated if we’re talking about deterrence or escalation management, but overall, the basis of nuclear forces is ballistic missiles, either ground-based or on submarines.
The role of aviation is also invaluable, its primary significance lying specifically in demonstrating power, desire, and the readiness to act. And it is in this capacity that strategic aviation has been used in recent years.
Podvig reminded Meduza that strategic bombers on airborne alert patrols do not actually carry live thermonuclear weapons. On President Putin’s orders, Russia resumed these flights in August 2007; however, warplanes fly with mock ordnance or none at all.
“In the Soviet Union, as I understand it, there was never a practice of patrolling with real nuclear warheads,” Podvig explained. He told Meduza that he is aware of a Soviet aircraft landing with nuclear weapons on board literally only once — when a malfunction during a weapons test forced the plane back to the airfield before it could drop the bomb.
Arms control limits
On social media, some observers have claimed that the New START Treaty, which expires in February 2026, requires Russia to keep its strategic bombers uncovered and in view of satellites. However, Podvig told Meduza that the agreement places no restrictions on hiding these aircraft under “environmental shelter,” which includes hangars.
The only circumstance under which an aircraft must be displayed in the open, he explained, is when either Moscow or Washington wishes to declare that it has eliminated that particular warplane from its fleet. “There’s a great photograph of one of these boneyards in the United States in Arizona, where these B-52s are lying there, all cut up into pieces neatly,” Podvig said, referring to Davis-Monthan Air Force Base in Tucson. Asked if Russia might try to claim the bombers destroyed in Ukraine’s drone strikes as warplanes dismantled under New START, he said it would likely be possible under the treaty, at least technically.
A new era of asymmetric warfare?
With a few truckloads of inexpensive drones, Ukraine managed to inflict significant damage on war machines that were key to Soviet national security in the Cold War. What prevents Kyiv from mounting similar attacks against Russian nuclear silos, nuclear submarines, and missile carriers? In his interview with Meduza, Pavel Podvig said Operation “Spiderweb” reveals the inadequacy of classic military machinery:
Yes, you can build bombers, missiles, submarines, and other things, but still, the question ultimately arises: what does this give you? When you really think about it, I think the answer is that this whole military machine is basically useless. If you encounter an opponent who really resists and can really inflict damage, then they’ll find a way to do it, and all these high-tech systems won’t help you at all. The basic point is that eventually you’ll have to pursue constructive engagement, diplomatic resolution, and non-military solutions.
At the same time, Podvig questioned the benefits of such attacks on Russia’s strategic arsenal, arguing that shock and awe in eastern Siberia does not liberate the Donbas, psychological effects notwithstanding:
Let’s imagine that Ukraine did attack a submarine base or a ballistic missile site — then what? What advantages would this give Ukraine on the battlefield? How would this help them end the war on terms that are acceptable to them? […] We find ourselves back to the same point: you probably can’t say that this attack will have no impact, but I also don’t see how it’s going to change anything strategically.
Podvig recalled Ukraine’s incursion into Russia’s Kursk region last year — another bold operation that surprised the world. “It certainly influenced the trajectory of subsequent developments to some degree,” he said, “but in the end, if you ask whether that operation led to any strategic result, I think the answer would probably be no.”
Interview by Vladislav Gorin
Summary for Meduza in English by Kevin Rothrock